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AN UNEASY BALANCE: PERSONAL INFORMATION 
AND CROWDFUNDING UNDER THE JOBS ACT 
 
Brice Kindred* 
 
Cite as: Brice Kindred, An Uneasy Balance: Personal Information and 
Crowdfunding Under the JOBS Act, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2015), 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v21i2/article4.pdf. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] “Crowdfunding” is the raising of small amounts of money from 
many different sources for a particular purpose.1  Today, this usually takes 
place online.2  Crowdfunding has become a popular means of raising funds 
for a wide variety of projects, causes, and business ventures.  Websites 
like Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and Crowdfunder allow people to create a 
profile for their project and solicit contributions from the general public in 
support.  
 
[2] As with online commercial activities in general, crowdfunding’s 
emergence raises issues regarding data privacy and the protection of 
personal information.  For example, how should the government regulate 
these websites?  What information should these websites collect?  Should 
there be established safeguards to ensure the security of that information?  
 
                                                 
*
 LL.M, Information Technology and Intellectual Property, University of Colorado Law 
School.  I would like to thank Professors Andrew Schwartz and Brad Bernthal at the 
University of Colorado School of Law for their input on this topic.  Special thanks go to 
Professor Paul Ohm for his guidance and feedback. 
 
1
 See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 10 (2012). 
 
2
 See id.; see also C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: 
Promise Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 195, 196 (2012) (“Crowdfunding is the use of the 
Internet to raise money through small donations from a large number of people—the 
‘crowd’ in crowdfunding.”).  
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[3] As this process has gained more popularity and attention, observers 
have highlighted crowdfunding’s potential to support entrepreneurs, small 
businesses, and startups that have historically struggled to raise the capital 
they need to survive.  However, Securities Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) regulations have prohibited using crowdfunding to raise capital in 
exchange for equity (i.e., ownership) in the respective business without 
first registering with the SEC.3  Specifically, those regulations have 
prohibited: 1) the “general solicitation” of investment;4 and 2) accepting 
investments by anyone without considerable wealth (referred to as 
“accredited investors”).5  “Hence, financing for fledgling firms is 
generally obtained from the so-called ‘three Fs’: ‘family, friends, and 
fools.’”6 
 
[4] In other words, individuals trying to start a business via 
crowdfunding were dependent on donors’ pure generosity, or the offer of a 
small reward (e.g., one of their products once the company got off the 
ground).  However strong these incentives may be, they are probably 
weaker than the opportunity to share in the profits of the business if it is 
successful.  Accordingly, securities regulation prohibited many of these 
emerging businesses from offering the strongest incentive through 
crowdfunding—ownership.  
 
                                                 
3
 See Bradford, supra note 1, at 42 (Offered securities “must be registered with the SEC 
unless an exemption is available.”).  
 
4
 Id. at 46 (“Rule 506 prohibits ‘general solicitation’ and ‘general advertising’ of the 
offering.  The SEC and its staff take the position that any solicitation of an investor with 
whom the issuer or its sales representatives do not have a preexisting relationship violates 
the general solicitation restriction.”). 
 
5
 Id. (“Section 4(5) of the Securities Act . . . is similar to Rule 506.  It allows offers and 
sales solely to accredited investors provided that there is no ‘advertising or public 
solicitation.’”); see also Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1457, 1461 (2013) (“The Securities Act has long exempted from its registration 
requirement securities sold to the founder’s friends and relations, or unrelated wealthy 
investors.”). 
 
6
 Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1461. 
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[5] President Obama believed equity crowdfunding could increase 
capital formation if existing regulation allowed it, and signed the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act in April 2012.7  Title II 
allows businesses that are not registered with the SEC to publicly solicit 
investment from wealthy “accredited investors.”8  Title III—the “Capital 
Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure” 
(“CROWDFUND”) Act—allows individual non-accredited investors to 
invest limited amounts via crowdfunding websites.9  This new freedom, 
however, does not go into effect until the SEC adopts implementing 
regulations.10 
 
[6] The CROWDFUND Act is not an absolute green light for 
crowdfunding investment.  It places significant restrictions on the amounts 
most people may invest based on their income and net worth.11  The 
crowdfunding platforms (e.g., websites) are responsible for making sure 
                                                 
7
 See Press Release, The White House, President Obama To Sign Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups (JOBS) Act (Apr. 5, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/04/05/president-obama-sign-jumpstart-our-business-startups-jobs-act, 
archived at http://perma.cc/JP7E-A96M (“The JOBS Act will allow Main Street small 
businesses and high-growth enterprises to raise capital from investors more efficiently, 
allowing small and young firms across the country to grow and hire faster.”). 
 
8
 See Usha Rodrigues, In Search of Safe Harbor: Suggestions for the New Rule 506(c), 66 
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 29, 32 (2013). 
 
9
 See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1461–62 (“[T]he maximum annual aggregate amount of 
crowdfunded securities that any one investor may purchase is limited based on a sliding 
scale.  If an investor’s net worth or annual income is under $100,000, she can invest the 
greater of $2,000, or five percent of her annual income, in crowdfunded securities each 
year.  If her net worth or annual income is over $100,000, she can invest 10% of her 
annual salary, capped at $100,000, per year.”). 
 
10
 See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, Keep It Light, Chairman White: SEC Rulemaking 
Under the CROWDFUND Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 43, 44 (2013) (The JOBS Act 
provisions “will go into effect once the [SEC] promulgates rules and regulations to 
govern the new marketplace for crowdfunded securities.”). 
 
11
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (2012). 
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that individual investors do not exceed those limitations, and the SEC is 
required to make rules to help the websites meet that obligation.12  Many 
consider these limitations central to the regulatory structure envisioned by 
the statute.13  Congress imposed the limits “to shield investors from losses 
of devastating magnitude.  It is practically impossible to lose one’s ‘life 
savings’ in crowdfunding, no matter how unwise or unlucky one’s choices 
may be.”14  Because the limitations are tied to investors’ income and net 
worth, effective enforcement might require investors to disclose 
significant personal information—including tax documents— 
“to ensure that no investor . . . exceed[s] the investment limits . . . .”15  
 
[7] This requirement intensifies the privacy-related issues identified 
above.  While intrinsically related, “privacy” and data “security” are 
separable concepts.  Generally speaking, “privacy” issues concern what 
information we disclose and what we keep to ourselves.  “Security,” on 
the other hand, refers to the ways our information is held and protected.  
These concepts will be described and distinguished in greater detail below.  
Centrally, the SEC—the agency tasked with constructing the applicable 
rules—must balance ensuring enforcement of the investment caps with 
investors’ privacy concern of releasing inherently personal information.  
On a related note, the SEC must also make a security decision concerning 
requirements “to protect the privacy of information collected from 
investors . . . .”16  
                                                 
12
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8) (2012). 
 
13
 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 10, at 59 (“The Act’s annual investment cap of $5,000 
is a bedrock statutory protection for crowdfunding investors . . . so enforcing this limit 
will be very important to the overall success of the Act.”); see also 158 CONG. REC. 
S5476 (daily ed. July 26, 2012) (statement of Sen. Merkley), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2012-07-26/html/CREC-2012-07-26-pt1-
PgS5474-3.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/HCG5-65JN (stating that the investment 
caps are “an important investor protection . . . for persons of lower income.”). 
 
14
 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 45. 
 
15
 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8) (2012). 
 
16
 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(9) (2012). 
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[8] This paper proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the crowdfunding 
concept and its historical development.  Part II introduces the JOBS Act 
and its privacy-related implications.  Part III describes the regulations the 
SEC proposed to implement the JOBS Act.  Part IV analyzes those 
proposed regulations, analyzes their privacy and security treatment, and 
recommends certain modifications. 
  
II.  CROWDFUNDING 
 
A.  What is Crowdfunding? 
 
[9] Fundamentally, “crowdfunding” is the raising of money for 
particular projects from a wide range of sources.17  Today, the concept is 
inextricably linked to the Internet.18  “Companies can pitch their company, 
set a funding goal amount, and leverage the power of the Internet to raise 
money through a large number of people (aka, the ‘crowd’).”19  
 
B.  History 
 
[10] The concept behind crowdfunding is nothing new, and has actually 
been used for centuries.  Many people credit Jonathan Swift as the father 
of the “microfinance” concept.20  Swift began making very small loans to 
                                                 
17
 See Bradford, supra note 1, at 5. 
 
18
 See id.; see also Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding And How Does It Benefit the 
Economy, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2012, 10:50 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-is-crowdfunding-and-how-
does-it-benefit-the-economy/, archived at http://perma.cc/XC74-MA2B.  
 
19
 About Crowdfunding, STARTUPVALLEY, http://www.startupvalley.com/moreinfo/about-
crowdfunding.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/XU5G-CBR6 (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).  
 
20 
See, e.g., Was Crowd Funding Really Invented In Ireland?, LINKED FINANCE (Feb. 10, 
2013), https://linkedfinance.wordpress.com/2013/02/10/was-crowd-funding-really-
invented-in-ireland/, archived at https://perma.cc/J8S7-WSS8; see also About 
Crowdfunding, supra note 19 (“Crowdfunding can be traced as far back as the 1700s.  An 
idea we now call Microfinancing, was started by Jonathan Swift in Ireland.  Here, Swift 
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tradesmen who had fallen on hard times but was nevertheless good in the 
community.21  The German publishing practice of “Praenumeration” is 
another 18th century example of the general crowdfunding concept.22  In 
other words, publishers offered a small reward to a group of donors in 
exchange for their financial support.  Crowdfunding also helped Joseph 
Pulitzer get the Statue of Liberty to the United States.23 
 
C.  Contemporary Uses 
 
[11] As noted above, crowdfunding has become associated with the 
Internet.  That progression was probably predictable given the exposure 
opportunities the Internet can provide.  Raising money from a crowd of 
people will likely be more successful, all other things being equal, the 
bigger the “crowd” becomes.  In that sense, the Internet was practically 
made for the development of crowdfunding.  Individuals and businesses 
are using crowdfunding to finance a staggering array of activities on 
almost countless websites.24  These efforts include: 
                                                                                                                         
began a fund that gave loans to low-income families throughout Ireland.”); M. Ibberson, 
Time For A History Lesson: The Evolution Of Crowdfunding, CROWDCLAN BLOG (Aug. 
22, 2013), http://www.crowdclan.com/time-for-a-history-lesson-the-evolution-of-
crowdfunding/, archived at http://perma.cc/9NHP-9ZAM (“You could say the evolution 
of crowdfunding started in the 1700s, a man by the name of Jonathan Swift created the 
Irish Loan Fund for low-income families.”).  
 
21
 See LINKED FINANCE, supra note 20 (The Irish Loan Fund provided “loans to low-
income rural-based families who had no credit history and little collateral but were 
considered creditworthy.”).  
 
22
 See Praenumeration, ENCYCLO.CO.UK, 
http://www.encyclo.co.uk/define/Praenumeration, archived at http://perma.cc/45Y5-
2N7D (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) (relating that book publishers “offered to sell a book 
that was planned but had not yet been printed, usually at a discount, so as to cover their 
costs in advance.”).  
 
23
 See Statue of Liberty, UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CENTRE, 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/307 (last visited Jan. 21, 2015); Statue Of Liberty: Pulitzer- 
In Depth, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/stli/historyculture/pulitzer-in-
depth.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/5WHU-LNLS (last updated Jan. 21, 2015). 
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 Medical expenses; 
 Charitable causes (e.g., natural disaster relief); 
 College financing; 
 Artistic endeavors (e.g., film production, recording projects, 
and book publication); 
 Food (e.g., restaurants, food trucks, and edible goods); and  
 Technology startups. 
 
D.  Surge 
 
[12] These activities have recently exploded.  In 2012, global 
crowdfunding increased eighty-one percent from 2011.25  “Overall, crowd 
funding platforms raised $2.7 billion worldwide in 2012, a figure expected 
to hit $5.1 billion this year . . . .”26  Websites facilitating crowdfunding 
have proliferated as well.  “According to industry estimates, there are 
currently over 500 active crowdfunding platforms—some sources have 
quoted 9,000 registered domain names related to crowdfunding.”27 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
24
 See, e.g., Ryan Caldbeck, Crowdfunding Trends: Which Crowdfunding Sites Will 
Survive, FORBES (June 23, 2013, 6:40 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancaldbeck/2013/06/23/crowdfunding-trends-which-
crowdfunding-sites-will-survive/, archived at http://perma.cc/QFE3-HHLD (As of June 
23, 2013, “[a]ccording to industry estimates, there are . . . over 500 active crowdfunding 
platforms [and] some sources have quoted 9,000 registered domain names related to 
crowdfunding.”). 
 
25
 See Kylie MacLellan, Global Crowdfunding Volumes Rise 81 Percent in 2012, 
REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2013, 12:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/08/us-
crowdfunding-data-idUSBRE9370QY20130408, archived at http://perma.cc/R4BC-
8PWX. 
 
26
 Arlene Weintraub, Find Money for College on Crowd Funding Sites, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT (Sept. 20, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-
colleges/paying-for-college/articles/2013/09/20/find-money-for-college-on-crowd-
funding-sites, archived at http://perma.cc/3NDF-NRKZ.  
 
27
 Caldbeck, supra note 24.  
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III.  JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STARTUPS (“JOBS”) ACT   
 
[13] The remainder of this paper is about a balance between competing 
investor concerns.  In the JOBS Act, Congress decided to employ 
crowdfunding as a tool to trigger the national economy.  But in doing so, it 
imposed investment limits to protect investors from severe economic 
damage caused by bad investments.  The SEC is tasked with creating 
regulations that enforce these limitations while also facilitating capital 
formation.  In carrying out those responsibilities, the SEC seems to have 
seriously undermined those protections by failing to require the 
information disclosures necessary to make them effective.  That decision, 
however, might protect investors in other ways, namely by promoting their 
privacy interests by limiting the amount and sensitivity of information 
investors must provide to crowdfunding intermediaries before they may 
participate.  
 
[14] Without necessarily even trying, the SEC might have actually 
struck the proper balance.  There is evidence that the small entities that are 
likely to drive crowdfunding are particularly vulnerable to the data 
breaches we have seen of late.  There are also few legal restrictions on 
how these intermediaries may use the information they collect from 
investors.  The rise in data brokers, and the relative lack of attention they 
have received, might also support limiting the information investors must 
provide.  Finally, the actual limits Congress set seem generally arbitrary.  
That is, there is little indication that these amounts are necessary or 
narrowly tailored to prevent the sort of harm envisioned.  In that case, the 
limits might not be worth enforcing.     
 
[15] Having introduced the crowdfunding concept, Section III of this 
paper describes how Congress and the President sought to harness its 
potential, and the information privacy issues that created.  The JOBS Act 
sought to ease the impact of traditional securities regulation that 
significantly constrained crowdfunding as a means of raising capital.  
Congress, however, was also concerned that unsophisticated investors 
could lose devastating amounts of money if left to their own devices in the 
crowdfunding marketplace.  As a result, it chose to limit annual 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 2 
 
 9 
investments to levels it considered safe based on individual investors’ 
income and/or net worth. 
 
A.  Need 
 
[16] The White House, along with many others, describes small 
businesses as “the engines of job creation and essential to strengthening 
our national economy.”28  As a result, helping them start, survive, and 
grow is a policy priority,29 and freeing capital for small businesses is a key 
component of that policy priority.  Many people have also touted 
crowdfunding as a potentially powerful means of accomplishing this 
objective.30  Two components of traditional securities regulation 
concerning registration and investor qualifications precluded businesses 
from using crowdfunding to raise capital in exchange for ownership of 
their venture.31  The following two subsections describe these regulations 
and their practical effects.  
                                                 
28
 Supporting Small Businesses, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/business/small-business, archived at  
http://perma.cc/KF24-LCNM (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).  
 
29
 See, e.g., Chairman Steve Chabot, Access to Capital, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SMALL 
BUSINESS, http://smallbusiness.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=5958, archived at 
http://perma.cc/RY5P-P7QX (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (acknowledging that “[o]ne of 
the biggest issues faced by small businesses is the inability to access sufficient credit and 
capital.”).  
 
30
 See, e.g., The White House, supra note 7 (The JOBS Act “will help growing businesses 
access financing while maintaining investor protections . . . in several ways . . . .” 
including through crowdfunding.); Eric Markowitz, Why the Crowdfunding Bill is Good 
for Start-ups, INC., http://www.inc.com/articles/201112/why-the-crowdfunding-
legislation-is-good-for-start-ups.html, archived at http://perma.cc/2XC8-HPLM (last 
updated Dec. 8, 2011) (quoting Sen. Scott Brown describing crowdfunding as “the grease 
that keeps the gears in the American economy churning.”); Prive, supra note 18 (“In a 
seemingly nonstop recession wave, small businesses are struggling more than ever to stay 
afloat, and entrepreneurs are not facing great odds.  Crowdfunding offers these 
individuals a chance at success, by showcasing their businesses and projects to the entire 
world.”). 
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1.  Traditional Regulation 
[17] “The Securities Act of 1933 . . . as amended, requires that any 
offer or sale of securities be registered with the [SEC] unless there is an 
exemption available.”32  Securities include “any . . . certificate of interest 
or participation in any profit-sharing agreement . . . transferable share, 
investment contract . . . [and] any instrument commonly known as a 
‘security’ . . . .”33  “The term . . . is broadly defined to include many 
instruments that might be bought or sold for investment.”34   
 
[18] The registration requirement has restricted crowdfunding’s 
potential to provide entrepreneurs, small businesses and startups with 
additional capital they need in two ways.  First, businesses generally had 
to register with the SEC before it could offer a “security” to the public.35  
The registration process alone is extremely expensive, and then the 
company had to pay for the actual solicitation of investment.36  Second, 
                                                                                                                         
31
 See, e.g., Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,429 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 and 249) (“Limitations under existing regulations, 
including restrictions on general solicitation and general advertising and purchaser 
qualification requirements, have made private placement exemptions generally 
unavailable for crowdfunding transactions, which are intended to be made to a large 
number of potential investors and not limited to investors that meet specific 
qualifications.”)  
 
32
 Douglas S. Ellenoff, Making Crowdfunding Credible, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 19, 
19 (2013); see also Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 31 (“Securities law requires companies to 
register the offer or sale of their shares with the SEC prior to sale, unless they can find an 
exemption from registration.”). 
 
33
 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012). 
 
34
 14 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 6833 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2012). 
 
35
 See Bradford, supra note 1, at 6 (“[S]ecurities offerings must be registered under the 
Securities Act of 1933 . . . unless an exemption is available.”).  
 
36
 See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1468. 
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outside of friends and family, SEC Regulation D generally only allowed 
businesses to accept investment from wealthy individuals and entities, 
known as “accredited investors.”37  As applied to natural persons, 
“accredited investor[s]” are generally those with a net worth of $1 million, 
or who made more than $200,000 in each of the previous two years.38 
 
2.  Restrictions Caused by the Traditional Regulatory 
Structure 
 
[19] Traditionally, based on these regulations, you had two choices.  
You could cough up a ton of cash, and then offer ownership in your 
company to non-friends or family in exchange for investment.39  Or, you 
could skip the substantial expense of SEC registration, but you could only 
sell ownership in the company to friends, family, and incredibly rich 
people (or entities like venture capital firms).40 
 
[20] Forcing startups, small businesses, and entrepreneurs to make this 
choice had predictable consequences.  Most young businesses simply 
                                                 
37
 See id. at 1467–68; see also Devin Thorpe, SEC Issues New Regulations for 
Crowdfunding; Panel Comments Live, FORBES (Oct. 24, 2013, 10:13 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/devinthorpe/2013/10/24/sec-issues-new-regs-for-
crowdfunding-panel-comments-live/, archived at perma.cc/5AS7-94V9 (“Limits are set 
by the Act on the amount of money non-accredited (those without a million-dollar net 
worth excluding their home or without a $200,000 personal income) investors may 
invest.”).  
 
38
 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6) (2014) (Marital status can affect these threshold 
amounts).  
 
39
 See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1466 (“The federal securities laws require that stocks, 
bonds, or other securities be registered with the SEC before being offered for sale to the 
public.”). 
 
40
 See id. at 1461 (“The Securities Act has long exempted from its registration 
requirement securities sold to the founder’s friends and relations, or unrelated wealthy 
investors.”). 
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cannot afford to go through the SEC registration process.41  The SEC cited 
commentary it received from interested parties arguing: 
 
[T]hat registered offerings are not feasible for raising 
smaller amounts of capital, as is done in a typical 
crowdfunding transaction, because of the costs of 
conducting a registered offering and the resulting ongoing 
reporting obligations under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 . . . that may arise as a result of the offering.42  
 
As a result, they are not allowed to raise funds by selling ownership in 
their business except to friends, family, and the wealthy accredited 
investors like angel investors and venture capitalists.  Unfortunately, most 
emerging business owners do not have the good fortune of a wealthy 
friend or family member willing to bankroll their entrepreneurial 
ventures.43  Similarly, an incredibly small percentage successfully raise 
funds from venture capital.44  Worse still, startups and entrepreneurs 
received less in loans in 2011 than they did in 2008 in the depths of the 
financial crisis.45  
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 See id. at 1467 (“[T]oday, the process of going public costs millions of dollars in legal, 
accounting, and other fees and, in a potentially related development, the number of 
companies electing to do so has shrunk to an all-time low.”). 
 
42
 Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,429. 
 
43
 See Bradford, supra note 1, at 5. 
 
44
 See id.; see also Bradford, supra note 2, at 196 (“Traditional sources of business 
financing—bank lending, venture capital, and angel investors—are unavailable to many 
startups and other very small offerings.”). 
 
45
 See Tanya Prive, Inside the JOBS Act: Equity Crowdfunding, FORBES (Nov. 6, 2012, 
11:57 AM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/06/inside-the-jobs-act-
equity-crowdfunding-2/, archived at http://perma.cc/S56T-J6VY. 
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B.  Provisions 
 
[21] The JOBS Act intended to ease those restrictions and make equity 
crowdfunding a viable source of capital for small and emerging 
businesses.46  With that goal in mind, the JOBS Act allows businesses to: 
1) “solicit” investment (but only accept money from the rich accredited 
investors);
47
 and 2) accept limited investment from unaccredited 
investors.
48
  The statute “seeks to more intelligently align capital 
formation with the way modern society operates and interacts on a daily 
basis.”49  The following subsections explain the important crowdfunding 
actors, and describe the actual provisions and goals of the JOBS Act. 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,429 (“The crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS 
Act were designed to help provide startups and small businesses with capital by making 
relatively low dollar offerings of securities less costly.”); see also James J. Williamson, 
Comment, The JOBS Act and Middle-Income Investors: Why it Doesn’t Go Far Enough, 
122 YALE L.J. 2069, 2071 (2013) (“The JOBS Act was designed to allow a wider class of 
Americans to invest in start-ups.”); National Crowdfunding Association, National 
Crowdfunding Association Welcomes SEC’s Proposed Investment Crowdfunding Rules, 
PR NEWSWIRE SERVICES (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/national-crowdfunding-association-welcomes-secs-proposed-investment-
crowdfunding-rules-229027541.html, archived at http://perma.cc/GP6T-494U (“As 
[SEC] Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher stated . . . ‘In Title III of the JOBS Act, 
Congress recognized the potential of the Internet to facilitate capital formation for very 
small companies at a critical stage of their growth.’”). 
 
47
 See Chance Barnett, The Crowdfunder’s Guide To General Solicitation And Title II of 
the JOBS Act, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2013, 10:40 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013/09/23/the-crowdfunders-guide-to-
general-solicitation-title-ii-of-the-jobs-act/, archived at http://perma.cc/M7JD-G5ZZ 
(“Only accredited investors can actually invest in fundraising rounds where companies 
generally solicit . . . .”). 
 
48
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012).  
 
49
 Ellenoff, supra note 32, at 19. 
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1.  Terms 
 
[22] The three primary actors in the equity crowdfunding process are: 
1) issuers; 2) investors; and 3) intermediaries.  An “issuer,” generally 
speaking, is any “person who issues or proposes to issue any security . . . 
.”50  In the crowdfunding context, these are the companies offering 
ownership in exchange for investment.51  Investors are simply the people 
purchasing ownership in the crowdfunded businesses (i.e., the “crowd”).  
 
[23] Financial intermediaries are the middlemen who actually facilitate 
the sale of crowdfunded securities to investors.52  They will serve the same 
general function that non-equity crowdfunding sites like Kickstarter 
currently perform.  Under the statute, intermediaries may operate as either 
a “broker” or “funding portal.”53  “[A] third party that operates a Web site 
to effect the purchase and sale of securities for the account of others 
generally would, under existing regulations, be required to register with 
the [SEC] as a broker-dealer and comply with the laws and regulations 
applicable to broker-dealers.”54  
 
[24] At the same time, “[a] person that operates such a Web site only 
for the purchase of securities of startups and small businesses . . . may find 
it impractical in view of the limited nature of that person’s activities and 
business to register as a broker-dealer and operate under the full set of 
regulatory obligations that apply . . . .”55  Accordingly, the statute provided 
                                                 
50
 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4) (2012). 
 
51
 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 48. 
 
52
 See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1462. 
 
53
 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(1) (2012). 
 
54
 Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,429 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 and 249). 
 
55
 Id. 
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for a second subcategory of intermediaries called “funding portal[s],”56 
which will “be subject to a new regulatory regime . . . established by SEC 
rulemaking.”57  Funding portals do not have “to register with the [SEC] as 
brokers,”58 but may not engage in certain activities.59 
 
2.  Title III—CROWDFUND Act 
 
[25] The CROWDFUND Act sought to make crowdfunding a viable 
means of raising capital without abandoning the investor protections that 
formed the traditional foundation of securities regulation.  This component 
of the JOBS Act “provides an exemption from the registration 
requirements of Securities Act Section 5 for certain crowdfunding 
transactions.”60  But it also imposed investment limits intended to protect 
investors from catastrophic financial harm.  These investment limits—and 
                                                 
56
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(1) (2012); Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,430 
(“[T]ransactions must be conducted through an intermediary that either is registered as a 
broker or is registered as a new type of entity called a ‘funding portal.’”). 
 
57
 Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1462. 
 
58
 Crowdfunding 101, NATIONAL CROWDFUNDING ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.nlcfa.org/crowdfund-101.html, archived at http://perma.cc/RR38-94T5 (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2015).  
 
59
 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80) (2012) (A “funding portal” is a crowdfunding intermediary 
“that does not[:] (A) offer investment advice or recommendations; (B) solicit purchases, 
sales, or offers to buy the securities offered or displayed on its website or portal; (C) 
compensate employees, agents, or other persons for such solicitation or based on the sale 
of securities displayed or referenced on its website or portal; (D) hold, manage, possess, 
or otherwise handle investor funds or securities; or (E) engage in such other activities as 
the Commission, by rule, determines appropriate.”); see also U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Division of Trading and Markets, Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act: Frequently Asked Questions About Crowdfunding Intermediaries, U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/tmjobsact-crowdfundingintermediariesfaq.htm, 
archived at http://perma.cc/NWV2-PGR7. 
 
60
 Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,430. 
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more particularly their enforcement—create the privacy and security 
issues that could affect the underlying goal of facilitating capital 
formation.  The limits cannot be enforced without requiring investors to 
disclose significant personal information.  The greater the required 
disclosures, the more investors’ privacy interests will be sacrificed.  
Investors may also shy away from investing through a crowdfunding 
platform if they have to document things like their income and/or net 
worth.  
 
[26] The law allows companies to raise up to $1 million per year in 
exchange for ownership in the business through crowdfunding.61  Investing 
in a startup, however, is risky.62  The majority of these businesses fail, so 
“much of the money given to [them] ends up being lost.”63  In fact, 
“[a]bout three quarters of venture-backed firms in the U.S. don’t return 
investors’ capital . . . .”64  
 
[27] Many also “worr[ied] . . . that inexperienced investors would be 
much more vulnerable to fraud [and] when one looks at the prospect of 
investment-based crowdfunding, the potential for fraud . . . is still a scary 
                                                 
61
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012) (establishing an exemption for “transactions 
involving the offer or sale of securities . . . provided that . . . the aggregate amount sold to 
all investors by the issuer . . . during the 12-month period preceding the date of such 
transaction . . . is not more than $1,000,000 . . . .”); see also Schwartz, supra note 10, at 
48. 
 
62
 See Timothy Spangler, Is Crowdfunding Good for Investors?, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 
30, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/currency/2013/10/is-crowdfunding-
good-for-investors, archived at http://perma.cc/NKA4-AXZL (“There’s another problem 
that has gotten less attention, but is likely to be much more common: most startups fail.”). 
 
63
 Id. 
 
64
 Id. (citing Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 Out of 4 Start-Ups Fail, WALL 
ST. J., available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443720204578004980476429190
, archived at http://perma.cc/DTB7-XMQM (last updated Sept. 20, 2012, 12:01 
AM)(quoting Shikar Ghosh)). 
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idea.”65  In comments to the SEC, William A. Jacobson—Director of the 
Cornell Securities Law Clinic—noted that: 
 
The potential or fraud and negligent misrepresentation in 
crowdfunding is high.  The safeguards and regulatory 
scrutiny found in registered public offerings are more 
stringent than what is provided under Regulation 
Crowdfunding, leaving investors to make decisions with 
information that is less complete and less vetted.  These 
investors may not have the experience to recognize unusual 
or outlandish claims and will be less likely to pay for due 
diligence than wealthier investors negotiating large 
investments in private equity offerings.66 
 
Some have suggested that lowering the regulatory burdens to allow equity 
crowdfunding “will very nearly legalize fraud in the stock market.”67  
Regulators were also skeptical that crowdfunding investors would be able 
                                                 
65
 Diogo Mourato, Investment Based Crowdfunding & The Knot in Your Stomach, DAILY 
CROWDSOURCE, http://dailycrowdsource.com/content/crowdfunding/1042-5-reasons-to-
worry-about-investment-based-crowdfunding, archived at http://perma.cc/38FS-CPAF 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2015).  
 
66
 Letter from William A. Jacobson, Clinical Professor of Law, Cornell Sec. Law Clinic, 
to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, United States Sec. and Exch. Comm’n 9 (Feb. 3, 2014), 
available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-219.pdf, archived at 
https://perma.cc/P4R8-HAC2. 
 
67
 Matt Taibbi, Why Obama’s JOBS Act Couldn’t Suck Worse, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 9, 
2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/why-obamas-jobs-act-
couldnt-suck-worse-20120409, archived at http://perma.cc/D4VY-GPJD; see also Jesse 
Hamilton & Phil Mattingly, Job-Creation Bill Seen Eviscerating U.S. Shareholder 
Protections, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 13, 2012, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-13/job-creation-legislation-seen-eviscerating-
shareholder-protections-in-u-s-.html, archived at http://perma.cc/88FS-78DF (“U.S. 
legislation that would roll back securities disclosure and governance rules in the name of 
job creation is being attacked by consumer advocates and former regulators as an 
evisceration of investor protections in place since the 1930s.”).  
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to appreciate these risks.  William Galvin, Secretary of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, explained: 
 
Longstanding problems in the markets for small and 
speculative stocks show the pitfalls of relying on the 
wisdom of crowds.  It is clearly possible to deceive large 
groups of investors, and it is definitely possible for fraud 
operators to swindle individuals.  Unscrupulous penny 
stock promoters have used misrepresentations to market 
obscure and low-value stocks to individuals, often through 
pump and dump schemes.68 
 
As a result, some controls were necessary to minimize crowdfunding 
investors’ financial exposure. 
 
[28] To minimize the inherent risk of betting on a stranger’s business 
idea on the Internet, Congress limited the amount each individual may 
invest via crowdfunding each year according to his or her income or net 
worth.69  For example, people who make less than $100,000 per year, or 
are worth less than $100,000, may invest $2,000 or five percent of their 
income or net worth, whichever is more.70  Individuals who make, or are 
worth, more than $100,000 per year may invest ten percent of their annual 
income or $100,000, whichever is more.71  
                                                 
68
 Comment by William F. Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on 
SEC Regulatory Initiatives Under the JOBS Act: Title III, Crowdfunding, at 1 (Aug. 8, 
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-121.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/SC73-CWZH. 
 
69
 See 158 CONG. REC. S5476 (daily ed. July 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2012-07-26/html/CREC-2012-07-26-pt1-
PgS5474-3.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/HCG5-65JN; see also Schwartz, supra note 
10, at 45 (“Congress also included an innovative structural protection for investors, 
specifically a strict annual cap on the aggregate amount that a person may invest in any 
and all crowdfunded securities.”). 
 
70
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i) (2012). 
 
71
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii) (2012). 
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[29] The concrete underpinnings of the investment limits Congress 
chose are unclear. Senator Jeff Merkley, an active crowdfunding 
proponent, explained that “[w]ithout aggregate caps, someone could in 
theory . . . unintentionally wip[e] out their entire savings.”72  The 
intermediaries are responsible for ensuring that investors do not exceed 
these limits by following rules the SEC will set.73  Intermediaries must 
“take such steps to protect the privacy of information collected from 
investors as the [SEC] shall, by rule, determine appropriate.”74 
 
[30] Issuers may not sell equity in their business directly to investors.  
Instead, “[t]he Act requires that all crowdfunded transactions be 
completed using a registered portal or broker-dealer.”75  These entities 
must “[r]egister with the SEC and [the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority] as either a portal or a broker-dealer.”76  Subsection D discusses 
the implication of privacy interests under the JOBS Act and the ways in 
which the SEC’s regulations might address those implications. 
 
C.  Privacy Complications 
 
1.  Privacy vs. Security 
[31] The first information issue confronting the SEC (i.e., determining 
what personal information should be disclosed to facilitate crowdfunding) 
is a “privacy” problem.  The second (i.e., how that information must be 
collected, stored, and managed) relates to security.  While the two 
                                                 
72
 158 CONG. REC. S5476 (daily ed. July 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2012-07-26/html/CREC-2012-07-26-pt1-
PgS5474-3.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/HCG5-65JN. 
 
73
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8) (2012).  
 
74
 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(9) (2012). 
 
75
 Thorpe, supra note 37. 
 
76
 Id. 
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concepts are frequently intertwined, “privacy” and “security” are actually 
distinct.77  “Privacy” refers to a “normative framework for deciding who 
should legitimately have the capability to access and alter information.78  
“Security,” on the other hand, describes “the set of technological 
mechanisms (including, at times, physical ones) that mediates requests for 
access or control.”79  In other words, privacy and security are intertwined 
as “[s]ecurity implements [our privacy] choices.”80  
 
[32] These issues relate to, and affect, one another.81  For example, 
“[d]ifferent security architectures make privacy regimes more or less 
                                                 
77
 See Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
667, 668–69 (2013); see also Leigh Nakanishi, The Difference Between Security and 
Privacy and Why We Must Better Communicate About Both, EDELMAN (Oct. 20, 2011), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130217100622/http://datasecurity.edelman.com/the-
difference-between-security-and-privacy-and-why-we-must-better-communicate-about-
both/, archived at https://perma.cc/WVC3-6HVL (“[I]n order to really understand and 
effectively communicate about these issues, it’s important to understand or think of them 
as two separate but related issues.”) (accessed by searching for 
http://datasecurity.edelman.com/the-difference-between-security-and-privacy-and-why-
we-must-better-communicate-about-both/ in the Internet Archive Wayback Machine). 
 
78
 See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 77, at 669; see also Nakanishi, supra note 77 (“Privacy 
is about governance and use.  More specifically, making sure the policies and rules are in 
place to ensure that information is being collected, shared and used in appropriate 
ways.”). 
 
79
 Bambauer, supra note 77, at 669; see also Nakanishi, supra note 77 (“Security and 
cybersecurity is about protection.  More specifically, it addresses how information is 
being protected from malicious actors and other unwanted parties who are trying to 
exploit it for a variety of motives from profit to espionage.”).  
 
80
 Bambauer, supra note 77, at 669. 
 
81
 See, e.g., id. at 677; see also Brian Anderson, The Difference Between Data Privacy 
and Data Security, EIQBLOG (Sept. 9, 2013, 5:55 AM), 
http://blog.eiqnetworks.com/blog/bid/313892/The-Difference-Between-Data-Privacy-
and-Data-Security, archived at http://perma.cc/C39D-AFNF (“Although data privacy and 
data security are often used as synonyms, they share more of a symbiotic type of 
relationship.”). 
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tenable, thereby influencing their development and adoption.”82  In the 
crowdfunding context, the viability of the SEC’s security policies could 
(and probably should) impact what information it requires investors to 
disclose.  Moreover, the SEC’s decisions concerning privacy and security 
have the potential to promote or undermine the statutory goal of 
facilitating capital formation startup financing.  Sacrificing some privacy 
(i.e., requiring investors to disclose more personal information) could chill 
investment by making the process more onerous and/or invasive.  
Effective security within each crowdfunding platform is essential to the 
credibility of this unfamiliar means of investment. Investors will not invest 
if they believe the information they provide is insecure.  If investors do not 
invest via crowdfunding platforms, then legalizing it will have little 
impact.  Neither security nor privacy issues related to equity crowdfunding 
have received significant attention, but both can affect the success of the 
JOBS Act, perhaps significantly.  
 
2.  Enforcement of Investment Limits 
 
[33] The CROWDFUND Act creates potential conflict between 
investors’ privacy interests and the fundamental goals of the statute (i.e., 
increasing access to capital for small businesses and startups by making 
investment easier for more people).  Congress chose to allow equity 
crowdfunding, but also imposed limits on the amount individuals could 
invest.83  Bypassing income verification “could turn [equity crowdfunding] 
into a casino with more losers than winners.”84  While generally supportive 
of a light regulatory approach, Professor Andrew Schwartz explains that 
“[t]he Act’s annual investment cap . . . is a bedrock statutory protection for 
                                                 
82
 Bambauer, supra note 77, at 677. 
 
83
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (2012). 
 
84
 John Wasik, Crowdfunding Rule Could Set Dangerous Precedent, FORBES (Oct. 21, 
2013, 4:07 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2013/10/21/crowdfunding-rule-
could-set-dangerous-precedent/, archived at http://perma.cc/URB9-P6ZW. 
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crowdfunding investors . . . so enforcing this limit will be very important 
to the overall success of the Act.”85  
 
[34] The desire for caps was probably motivated, in part, by recent 
economic catastrophes involving overextended investors and those who 
take advantage of them.86  While protecting investors from economic 
destruction is a noble goal, the precise caps in the statute may not be well 
tailored to that objective.  The limits proposed in Congress varied widely 
from $1,000 to $10,000 per person.87  It is unclear why $1,000 is not 
enough, $10,000 is too much, but $2,000 to $5,000 is generally an 
appropriate amount of risk for most investors.  For that matter, why should 
Congress limit crowdfunding investment to $2,000 per year when anyone 
can buy as many lottery tickets as they can afford?88  Furthermore, 
effective enforcement of these limits would likely require investors to 
                                                 
85
 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 59. 
 
86
 See, e.g., Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the 
Resulting Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 125, 128 (2009) 
(quoting Robert Shiller, Definition of Irrational Exuberance, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, 
http://www.irrationalexuberance.com/definition.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/P8JJ-
RN8Z (last visited Jan. 21, 2015)) (“The one essential cause of the housing bubble was 
irrational exuberance,” defined as “a heightened state of speculative fervor.”); see also 
Brian Farnkoff, Crowdfunding for Biotechs: How the SEC’s Proposed Rule May 
Undermine Capital Formation for Startups, 30 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH  L. & POL’Y 131, 
174–75 (2013) (discussing the causes of the mortgage crisis and parallel concerns 
motivating investor protections in the crowdfunding context).  
 
87
 See Barb Darrow, Senator Brown: The Time to Act on Crowdfunding Bill Is Now, 
GIGAOM (Mar. 5, 2012, 9:11 AM), http://gigaom.com/2012/03/05/senator-brown-the-
time-to-act-on-crowdsourcing-bill-is-now/, archived at http://perma.cc/7RMV-8PUQ.  
 
88
 See Andrew Farquharson, Andrew Farquharson: More of a Hindrance than Help, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2013, 8:00 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/accelerators/2013/11/27/andrew-farquharson-more-of-a-hindrance-
than-help/, archived at http://perma.cc/C92T-U3Z7 (“Individuals can . . . invest in tickets 
for the state lottery, with no protection from the government.  So why not allow average 
citizens to have investment access to opportunities that have traditionally been reserved 
for the wealthy?”).  
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 2 
 
 23 
disclose significant personal information to the intermediaries.  Thus, the 
CROWDFUND Act raises an important privacy-related question for the 
SEC to answer.  Namely, what information should investors disclose to 
facilitate enforcement of the statutory investment limits?89  If the specific 
limits are poorly drawn, should the SEC sacrifice investor privacy and 
easy capital formation to facilitate their enforcement? 
 
[35] Consider two possible regulatory approaches to illustrate the 
tension between actual enforcement and privacy.  The SEC could allow 
intermediaries to rely on investors to simply report their income or net 
worth.  The House of Representatives version of the JOBS Act actually 
took this approach, allowing intermediaries to “rely on certifications as to 
annual income provided by the person to whom the securities are sold to 
verify the investor’s income.”90  That would protect investors’ privacy by 
allowing them to invest without disclosing documentary proof of their 
income like tax returns.  However, it would fall far short of “ensur[ing] 
that no investor . . . has purchased crowdfunded securities that” exceed the 
statutory caps because investors could very simply lie.
91
  That is possibly 
troubling given that individuals could invest more by reporting more 
income or net worth.  This approach does little to address the incentive 
investors have to provide inaccurate information.  
 
[36] Alternatively, the SEC could impose significant obligations on 
intermediaries—and investors, for that matter—to make sure individual 
investors do not exceed their investment limits.  In the context of 
investment solicitation and establishing accreditation, “[u]ntil now, 
investors have ‘self-certified’ that they qualify for accedited [sic] status.  
However, the new SEC regulations will require some to start handing over 
personal financial information, like tax returns, to prove their net worth [or 
                                                 
89
 See Bradford, supra note 2, at 202 (“It [was] unclear what the SEC will require 
intermediaries to do to enforce this aggregate limit.”). 
 
90
 H.R. Res. 3606, 112th Cong. § 4A(c) (as passed by House, Apr. 5, 2012) (enacted); see 
also Farnkoff, supra note 86, at 164.  
 
91
 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 60 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8) (2012)).  
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income].”92  Under this approach, the SEC could require intermediaries to 
collect tax returns and/or bank statements and verify the investor’s income 
and/or net worth, and that their investments do not exceed the cap.  
 
[37] Congress and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau have 
required this sort of scrutiny in the mortgage context.93  Creditors 
providing mortgage loans must make “a reasonable and good faith 
determination based on verified and documented information that . . . the 
consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan . . . .”94  In making that 
determination, the creditor should collect and analyze “the consumer’s 
Internal Revenue Service Form W–2, tax returns, payroll receipts, 
financial institution records, or other third-party documents that provide 
reasonably reliable evidence of the consumer’s income or assets.”95 
 
[38] Taking a similar approach to enforce crowdfunding limits would 
clearly implicate investors’ privacy interests to a greater degree, but it 
might also facilitate enforcement of the investment caps that Congress 
thought were so important to protecting investors.  At the same time, this 
                                                 
92
 J.D. Harrison, Can Crowdfunding Fill Stock Market’s ‘Black Hole’ for Startups and 
Small Businesses?, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2013), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-26/business/41447075_1_black-hole-stock-
market-most-firms, archived at http://perma.cc/5YVT-CB7C. 
 
93
 See What Is the Ability-to-Repay Rule? Why Is It Important to me?, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1787/what-ability-
repay-rule-why-it-important-me.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4QH9-ZXKJ (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2015) (“Congress responded [to housing contributions to the financial 
crisis] by passing a common-sense law that says mortgage lenders must make a 
reasonable effort to figure out if a borrower has the ability to repay the mortgage before 
the loan is made.  The CFPB is responsible for enforcing this law, and we have written 
a rule that says lenders have to make a reasonable and good-faith effort to figure out a 
borrower’s ability to repay a mortgage.  In practice this means lenders must generally 
find out, consider, and document a borrower’s income, assets, employment, credit history 
and monthly expenses.”). 
 
94
 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1) (2012).  
 
95
 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(4) (2012). 
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approach could undermine perhaps the most fundamental purpose of the 
CROWDFUND Act—making it easier for individuals to invest and 
businesses to raise capital.  Some investors would very likely forego the 
opportunity to invest instead of gathering and disclosing this sort of 
documentation, and intermediaries would face additional burdens 
associated with collecting and scrutinizing the data. 
 
[39] Disconnect among intermediaries could make it extremely difficult 
to enforce the “aggregate” investment limits set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 
77d(a)(6)(B).96  “The intermediary’s records will show how much each 
investor has purchased through its site, but investors might also have 
purchased [crowdfunded securities] on other sites.”97  Once again, “[t]he 
intermediary could ask the investor how much he has invested on other 
crowdfunding sites, but the answer might be intentionally or 
unintentionally incorrect.”98  Professor Andrew Schwartz identified even 
less sinister ways that self-verification could defeat enforcement of the 
investment caps:  
 
It may not be enough, for instance, for intermediaries to 
simply ask investors whether they have reached their 
annual limit and leave it at that, as crowdfunding investors 
might not remember or keep records of their past 
investments.  Nor can intermediaries rely solely on their 
own internal records, as the cap is an aggregate one for all 
crowdfunding securities purchased on any platform and 
from any issuer.99   
                                                 
96
 See 15 U.S.C. 77d(a)(6)(B). 
 
97
 Bradford, supra note 2, at 202. 
 
98
 Id. 
 
99
 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 60; see also Letter from Andrea Seidt, President, North 
Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3 
(Feb. 3, 2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-286.pdf, 
archived at https://perma.cc/PL4Y-72JP (“First, it is not clear that retail investors will be 
keeping careful tabs on their individual investment amounts.  Given the relatively small 
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In other words, relying on investors to verify their investment suffers from 
the same flaws as relying on self-verification of income and net worth. 
 
[40] Accordingly, the SEC faces something of a catch-22.  Senator Jeff 
Merkley, one of the JOBS Act’s Senate cosponsors, described two goals in 
creating the crowdfunding provisions.  First, the drafters sought to 
“enable[e] [the crowdfunding] market to work for startups and small 
businesses . . . .”100  Second, they focused on “protecting ordinary 
investors from fraud and deception.”101  As suggested, these two 
objectives might conflict with each other.  The investor protections 
implemented by Congress (i.e., investment limits) require information 
from investors to be effective.  Mark Cuban and others, however, have 
expressed skepticism that people will sacrifice certain personal 
information in order to invest.
102
  Furthermore, enforcing the investment 
limits may not justify sacrificing investors’ privacy and the statutory goal 
of capital formation if the limits are arbitrarily drawn or only loosely 
connected to protecting investors.  Achieving the statutory goals requires 
“smart, effective rules and consistent, conscientious oversight by the . . . 
SEC . . . and the State securities regulators.”103 
                                                                                                                         
investment amounts commonly sought in crowdfunding deals, as low as a single $1 
investment in many instances, it would be fairly easy for an active crowdfunding investor 
to lose track.  Second, investors may miscalculate their net income or net worth—for 
example, an investor could easily assume that net worth includes the value of his or her 
principal place of business.  Without some form of independent, third-party check, there 
is a significant likelihood that investors, by accident or design, will not report accurate 
amounts and ultimately exceed statutory limits.”). 
 
100
 158 CONG. REC. S5475 (daily ed. July 26, 2012) (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2012-07-26/html/CREC-2012-07-26-
pt1-PgS5474-3.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/HCG5-65JN. 
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[41] Unless a sophisticated balance is struck, the SEC regulations may 
either give up enforcement of important investor protections or undermine 
the fundamental point of the law.
104
  The SEC also recognized the nature 
of its task.  In the notice of its proposed rules under the CROWDFUND 
Act, it noted, “[r]ules that are unduly burdensome could discourage 
participation in crowdfunding.  Rules that are too permissive, however, 
may increase the risks for individual investors, thereby undermining the 
facilitation of capital raising for startups and small businesses.”105 
 
[42] Professor C. Steven Bradford concludes that “[t]he only totally 
effective solution would be to establish a central recordkeeping system 
and require intermediaries to report every . . . purchase.”106  He notes, 
however, that “a system like that would be expensive [and s]elf-reporting . 
. . may be the only cost-effective method.”107  The implementation of a 
centralized collection and monitoring system would also have to be 
assigned to some governmental or private entity.108  Finally, deciding to 
centralize monitoring activities does not dictate what information is 
necessary to effectively monitor.  As a result, we would still have to 
                                                                                                                         
103
 158 Cong. Rec. S5475 (daily ed. July 26, 2012) (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2012-07-26/html/CREC-2012-07-26-
pt1-PgS5474-3.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/HCG5-65JN. 
 
104
 See Bradford, supra note 1, at 8 (“The devil is in the details. Crafting a crowdfunding 
exemption [to securities law] requires a careful balancing of investor protection and 
capital formation.”). 
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 Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,430 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
200, 227, 232, 239, 240 and 249). 
 
106
 Bradford, supra note 2, at 202. 
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 Id.  But see Schwartz, supra note 10, at 60 (“Modern information technology may 
make it possible to enforce the cap at very low cost, even across different crowdfunding 
platforms.”). 
 
108
 See Farnkoff, supra note 86, at 177 (“Such a centralized system could ideally be 
created and staffed by either the Commission itself or some (sole) third party verification 
service with the blessing of the SEC.”).  
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decide what investors should disclose to intermediaries to allow a central 
monitoring authority to ensure that they remain within their unique 
investment boundaries. 
 
[43] Other observers have also proposed alternatives to—or variations 
of—the extreme regulatory options discussed above (i.e., self-verification 
and intensive disclosures).  For example, relying on statements by Senator 
Merkley, Professor J. Robert Brown suggests that self-certification of 
income and net worth could be used when investment amounts are low.109  
Professor Brown acknowledges that this would not prevent investors from 
providing false information, or eliminate the information gap among 
intermediaries.110  He does note, however, that “the modest nature of the 
amounts is consistent with the idea of crowdfunding, minimizes the 
possibility that investors will risk a significant amount in a single offering, 
and reduces the incentives of third parties to provide false information to 
intermediaries on behalf of these investors.”111 
 
[44] Professor Brown has also discussed the possibility of asking for 
more personal information than a mere statement of income and/or net 
worth, while stopping short of disclosing sensitive documents.112  For 
example, he proposed empowering intermediaries to “require disclosure of 
the material sources of income and the amount attributed to each.”113  
Alternatively, “investors could be asked about the source of the funds that 
would be used in the offering.”114  Going further, heightened scrutiny by 
                                                 
109
 See Memorandum from J. Robert Brown, Jr., Professor of Law, Univ. of Denver 
Sturm Coll. of Law, on Crowdfunding, Exchange Act Release No. 70741 6 (Jan. 27, 
2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-148.pdf, archived at 
https://perma.cc/4UN2-F77W. 
 
110
 See id. 
 
111
 Id. 
 
112
 Id. at 7. 
 
113
 Id. 
 
114
 Id. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 2 
 
 29 
the intermediaries could complement the additional disclosures.  
Specifically, “intermediaries should have at least some obligation to 
engage in ‘spot checks’ of income and net worth,” and “more meaningful 
guidance on . . . when information would be deemed unreliable.”115 
 
[45] The sum of slightly more disclosure and slightly more oversight 
might significantly improve the enforcement of the investment caps.  It is 
unlikely to prevent investors from exceeding their statutory limits, 
particularly without centralized control over the information they are 
required to provide.  Perfection, however, should not be the enemy of 
good.  Some investors will exceed their investment limits no matter how 
the SEC structures its rules.  The appropriate question should probably be 
whether an increased enforcement level justifies the additional time, 
expense and trouble it imposes on investors, intermediaries and the 
government.116  
 
[46] The Cornell Securities Law Clinic suggested specifying the 
information that intermediaries must collect in order to enforce the 
investment caps.117  Doing so would provide intermediaries with a degree 
of regulatory certainty while “prevent[ing] intermediaries from using an 
unintended interpretation of an ambiguous standard to justify their failure 
to collect information that would require them to prevent investors from 
being involved in an offering.”118  In other words, it serves the potentially 
competing interests of promoting efficiency and investor protection.  At 
the very least, the Cornell Clinic supported requiring the collection of 
“identifying information to prevent duplicate or fraudulent accounts as 
well as information regarding other intermediary accounts and 
investments.”119  Unfortunately, this does not help identify what specific 
                                                 
115
 Brown, supra note 109, at 7. 
 
116
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information that might include.  Furthermore, while this information might 
prevent investors from exceeding their individual limits across multiple 
platforms, it would not establish what those respective limits are in the 
first place.  Disclosing personal information up to bank accounts and tax 
returns would still be necessary. 
 
[47] Lastly, William F. Galvin—Secretary of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts—encouraged the SEC to provide for fines when 
intermediaries fail to satisfy their enforcement responsibilities.
120
  “For 
example, the Commission could impose a fine if it determines that an 
intermediary had no reasonable basis for believing that an investor met the 
required qualifications.”121  This approach is different from the others in 
that it does not focus on the tools and infrastructure intermediaries would 
need “to ensure that no investor in a 12-month period has purchased 
securities . . . that . . . exceed the investment limits . . . .”122  Instead, it 
attempts to adjust the incentives intermediaries have to act diligently.
123 
  
Under the proposed regulations, intermediaries have no significant duty to 
enforce the investment limits, and real incentives to allow investors to 
spend as much as they would like.124  Dangling the threat of fines might 
encourage intermediaries to pay attention to information provided by 
investors when they would otherwise turn a blind eye.125 
 
                                                 
120
 See, e.g., Letter from William F. Galvin, Sec’y of the Commonwealth of Mass., to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (Feb. 3, 2014), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-213.pdf, archived at 
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3.  Information Security 
[48] The SEC must also decide how crowdfunding intermediaries 
handle the personal information they do collect.  The SEC has some 
experience with security issues, so it may not be completely unequipped to 
address this issue.  At the same time, the SEC’s staff devoted to privacy 
issues appears small,126 and the Commission’s experience is limited 
relative to other federal agencies like the Federal Trade Commission.  
Finally, the entities the SEC will be regulating in the crowdfunding 
context will probably differ greatly from those it currently regulates, 
which could further limit the value of its current experience.  As a result, 
the SEC should seriously consider the applicability of its current rules to 
crowdfunding and create a new set of security regulations for these 
intermediaries that restrict the ways they can use investors’ personal 
information. 
a.  Regulation S-P 
 
[49] SEC Regulation S-P implements the Commission’s privacy and 
security policies by limiting the “nonpublic personal information” a 
financial institution under the SEC’s regulatory purview may disclose to 
third parties.127  For example, entities subject to Regulation S-P may not 
disclose nonpublic personal information to any nonaffiliated third party 
without first: (1) giving the individual notice of its policies; (2) providing 
the individual with “a clear and conspicuous notice” that the institution 
may disclose their information; and (3) giving the individual an 
                                                 
126
 See About Privacy at the SEC, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/privacy/secprivacyoffice.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z5JL-9U5N (last modified Mar. 13, 2013) (listing four staffers as 
contacts). 
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opportunity to opt out, and (4) instructions how to opt out of any such 
disclosures.128  
 
[50] The SEC also requires institutions under its control “to adopt 
appropriate policies and procedures that address safeguards to protect this 
information” pursuant to Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.129  
Specifically, those policies:  
 
[M]ust be reasonably designed to:  
 
(1) Insure the security and confidentiality of customer 
records and information; 
(2) Protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the 
security or integrity of customer records and information; 
and  
(3) Protect against unauthorized access to or use of 
customer records or information that could result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.130 
 
In effect, there are no concrete requirements.  Instead, the SEC passes the 
responsibility of setting those requirements to the regulated entities that 
have to live by them. 
b.  Regulation S-ID 
[51] SEC Regulation S-ID aims to prevent identity theft.  In general, the 
rule “requires brokers to develop and implement a written identity theft 
prevention program that is designed to detect, prevent and mitigate 
                                                 
128
 Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg. 40,334, 
40,351 (June 29, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2000-06-29/pdf/00-16269.pdf, archived at 
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identity theft in connection with certain existing accounts or the opening 
of new accounts.”131  
 
[52] Here again, the SEC allows the regulated entities to “develop” 
their own “identity theft prevention program[s],” but requires “each 
Program be appropriate to the size and complexity of the financial 
institution or creditor and the nature and scope of its activities.”132  
Regulation S-ID goes slightly further and requires each “Program [to] 
include reasonable policies and procedures to: (i) Identify relevant Red 
Flags . . . and incorporate those Red Flags . . . ; (ii) Detect Red Flags that 
have been incorporated into the Program . . . ; (iii) Respond appropriately 
to any Red Flags that are detected . . . ; and (iv) Ensure the Program . . . is 
updated periodically . . . .”133  Lastly, each entity must implement its 
Program by: 
 
1. Obtaining approval of the initial Program from “its board of 
directors or an appropriate committee of the board of 
directors;” 
2. “Involve [at least] a designated employee at the level of senior 
management in the oversight, development, implementation 
and administration of the Program;” 
3. Adequately train staff “to effectively implement the Program;” 
and 
                                                 
131
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4. Effectively overseeing agreements with the company's service 
providers.
134
 
 
IV.  PROPOSED SEC REGULATIONS AND PERSONAL INFORMATION   
 
[53] The SEC proposed regulations implementing the CROWDFUND 
Act on October 23, 2013.  The proposed rules generally reflect the SEC’s 
goal of balancing investor protection with facilitating crowdfunding as a 
source of capital.
135
  In the 585-page document, the SEC addressed what 
information investors would have to disclose pursuant to the investment 
limits, the information intermediaries would have to collect to prevent 
crimes like money laundering and financing of terrorism and the 
safeguards intermediaries would have to impose to protect the personal 
information they collect.136  This section discusses the collection, handling, 
and protection of personal information under the SEC’s proposed rules 
implementing Title III of the JOBS Act. 
 
A.  Enforcement of Investment Caps 
[54] The SEC “recognize[d] that it would be difficult for intermediaries 
to monitor or independently verify whether each investor remains within 
his or her investment limits . . . .”137  Having emphasized the JOBS Act’s 
                                                 
134
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laundering] obligations imposed on financial institutions.  The BSA is intended to 
facilitate the prevention, detection and prosecution of money laundering, terrorist 
financing and other financial crimes.”). 
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purpose of freeing capital for startups and small businesses, and 
recognizing the detrimental effects of significant regulation, the SEC 
proposed perhaps the smallest possible disclosure burden on investors.  
Under the proposed rules, investors would be allowed to self-report their 
income and/or net worth for intermediaries to calculate the applicable 
investment limit under the statute.
138
  
 
[55] As discussed above, the SEC could have easily chosen to require 
substantially greater disclosures under the statutory scheme.  For example, 
the SEC could have required intermediaries to collect: (1) tax returns; (2) 
Form W-2s; (3) pay stubs; and/or (4) bank statements from investors and 
crosscheck those documents against the income and net worth the investor 
reported.  Actual enforcement of the investment caps probably requires the 
collection of documents related to investors’ income and net worth.  
Otherwise, intermediaries are left to rely on word of mouth.  Collecting 
documents, however, would probably impose additional (and perhaps 
costly) recordkeeping obligations on intermediaries to make sure the 
sensitive documents are kept safe.  It would also impose more work on 
intermediaries in the form of verifying investors’ information before 
allowing investment.  Many stakeholders, particularly issuers and 
intermediaries, have argued that “[i]t is virtually impossible to do income 
verification for an individual, and that is why we have to rely on self-
disclosure . . . .”139  In effect, the SEC’s proposed rule reflects the 
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reasoning that actual enforcement is unlikely in any event, so why impose 
any regulatory burden at all? 
 
B.  Crime Prevention 
 
[56] The SEC determined “that funding portals could play a critical role 
in detecting, preventing, and reporting money laundering and other illicit 
financing, such as market manipulation and fraud.”140  According to the 
SEC, “a funding portal . . . is in the best position to ‘know its customers,’ 
and to identify and monitor for suspicious and potentially illicit activity at 
the individual customer level . . . .”141  As a result, “[t]he proposed rules 
require that funding portals comply with [preventative requirements 
associated with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)].”142  Under these 
requirements, funding portals must: 
 
(1) [e]stablish and maintain an effective [anti-money 
laundering] program (“AML Program Requirement”);  
(2) establish and maintain a Customer Identification 
Program (“CIP Requirement”);  
(3) monitor for and file reports of suspicious activity (“the 
SAR Requirement”); and  
(4) comply with requests for information from the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) (the “Section 
314(a) Requirements”).143  
 
Of these, the SEC anticipates “that the nature of a funding portal’s 
business would typically implicate the AML Program Requirement, the 
                                                 
140
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CIP Requirement, the SAR Requirement and the information sharing 
provisions of the Section 314(a) Requirements.”144  
 
[57] Of those, the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network’s (“FinCEN”) regulations compromise investor 
privacy the most.  In fact, those provisions probably require the disclosure 
of more personal information than any other part of the crowdfunding 
process.  Intermediaries’ FinCEN procedures must: 
 
[I]nclude[] procedures for:  
 
(1) [o]btaining customer identifying information from each 
customer prior to account opening;  
(2) verifying the identity of each customer, to the extent 
reasonable and practicable, within a reasonable time before 
or after account opening;  
(3) making and maintaining a record of obtained 
information relating to identity verification;  
(4) determining, within a reasonable time after account 
opening or earlier, whether a customer appears on any list 
of known or suspected terrorist organizations designated by 
Treasury; and  
(5) providing each customer with adequate notice, prior to 
opening an account, that information is being requested to 
verify the customer’s identity.145 
 
B.  Security 
 
[58] Even after acknowledging that existing regulations might not 
address issues crowdfunding raises, the Commission determined “it is 
unnecessary to repeat identical, existing requirements, in a separate rule 
                                                 
144
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proposal . . . or to propose rules that would apply not only to 
crowdfunding, but to a broader set of technology-based activity.”146  
Accordingly, the SEC proposed simply extending its existing “Privacy 
Rules”—discussed in section II.C.3 above—to funding portals in the 
crowdfunding arena.147 
 
V.  ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 A.  The Proposed SEC Regulations Favor Capital Formation 
(and Privacy) at the Expense of the Investment Limits 
 
[59] From a normative standpoint, relying on investors’ self-reported 
information strikes a good balance between capital formation and investor 
protection.  This is a “fundamental challenge with any piece of securities 
regulation . . . .”148  The chilling effect of regulation on capital formation 
could be particularly acute in this instance because increased compliance 
costs could quickly outweigh the relatively small amounts being raised.149  
The SEC’s approach tends heavily toward facilitating crowdfunding’s 
capital-raising potential by declining many of the regulatory burdens the 
Commission could have imposed.  Investor privacy is also a tangential 
beneficiary in that investors will disclose relatively little personal 
information before they may invest via crowdfunding platforms.  In fact, 
privacy-minded investors would not necessarily have to disclose any 
personal information.  Because the proposed rules do not require any 
documentary evidence of income or net worth, investors could simply lie.  
In that case, intermediaries would know no more about the individual 
investor than they did before any transactions took place.  This could also 
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minimize the potential harm caused by any unintentional disclosures or 
improper uses.  
 
[60] Critics of the SEC’s approach can fairly point out that it 
fundamentally compromises the investment limits.150  Allowing 
intermediaries to rely on investors’ self-reported income and net worth 
effectively eliminates the statutory investment caps by making them 
impossible to effectively enforce.  Without some objective documentation, 
investors can quite easily claim grossly inflated amounts in order to invest 
greater amounts on an intermediary’s website.  According to the SEC, 
“[t]he intermediary could not rely on an investor’s representations if the 
intermediary had reason to question the reliability of the representation,”151 
but without the disclosure of more information, what would give “the 
intermediary . . . reason to question [its] reliability”?152  It is also doubtful 
that an intermediary would have much incentive to question an investor’s 
representation that allowed the investor to invest more money through its 
site.  This may very well be the best policy decision, but it is important to 
note that it essentially nullifies this “bedrock statutory protection for 
crowdfunding investors . . . .”153  While even proponents of a light 
regulatory approach argue for “a relatively heavy burden on intermediaries 
to enforce [the limits],” the SEC would essentially regulate enforcement 
out of the statute.154  
 
[61] The fact that the SEC’s proposed balance so fundamentally 
compromises the investment limits could give rise to legal challenges 
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alleging that it abused its discretion in creating the rules.155  Courts analyze 
administrative rules like those the SEC proposed under the two-part 
Chevron evaluation.156  First, the Court considers whether Congress 
expressly stated how it expected the agency to implement the statute.157  
Agencies have to follow Congress’ instruction in that event.158  If the 
relevant statute is ambiguous—that is, “Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue”—“the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”159  When Congress tells an agency to take a particular action, the 
way the agency does so is “permissible” unless it is somehow “arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”160  This standard is highly 
deferential to an agency’s interpretation.161  The fundamental question 
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under Chevron “is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within 
the bounds of its statutory authority.”162 
 
[62] As explained above, the JOBS Act imposed a difficult balancing 
act on the SEC.163  Intermediaries must “make such efforts as the [SEC] 
determines appropriate, by rule, to ensure that no investor in a 12-month 
period has purchased securities . . . that . . . exceed the investment limits . . 
. .”164  Accordingly, the SEC is responsible for determining what efforts 
are appropriate.165  The statute, however, does not identify any efforts that 
would be inappropriate.166  In other words, the statutory language is 
ambiguous, and simply defers to the SEC to make the determination. 
 
[63] The SEC exercised its broad discretion and determined that the sort 
of disclosures that would facilitate effective enforcement of the investment 
limits were not appropriate.167  In doing so, it seems to have relied on the 
small, but fundamental, bit of statutory language it could find to guide its 
decision.  The first line of the JOBS Act describes it as “[a]n Act [t]o 
increase American job creation and economic growth by improving access 
to the public capital markets for emerging growth companies.”168  The 
investment caps are investor protections “designed to shield [them] from 
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losses of devastating magnitude.”169  But extensive enforcement 
requirements could burden intermediaries and undermine their ability to 
facilitate capital formation.170  The SEC might also consider the actual risk 
of fraud crowdfunding investors face in determining what measures are 
appropriate.  Ethan Mollick, a management professor at The Wharton 
School of the University of Pennsylvania, “has done extensive research on 
crowdfunding and was consulted by legislators and the SEC on equity 
crowdfunding . . . .”171  According to Professor Mollick, “[l]ess than 1% of 
funds and 4% of the projects he studied showed signs of fraud.”172  
Moreover, the open nature of crowdfunded offerings mitigates against 
fraud on its own.173  Low risk and the potential to undermine the statutory 
goal probably makes imposing a lighter enforcement burden appropriate.  
Given the tension between enforcement of the limits and the JOBS Act’s 
overarching objective of facilitating capital investment, as well as the 
considerable discretion it received in the statute, the SEC’s proposed rules 
probably qualify as a “permissible” construction of the statute. 
 
[64] A number of securities law experts would probably disagree with 
that conclusion, however.174  The North American Securities 
Administrators Association (“NASAA”) implied that the SEC does not 
have the statutory discretion to rely on self-certification.175  Given his view 
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that that “the whole statutory scheme depends on [effectively enforcing 
the investment limits],” and the obvious enforcement gaps in a self-
certification scheme, Professor Schwartz might rightly conclude that the 
SEC’s plan is not “reasonable.”176  Brian Farnkoff looked to the legislative 
history and concluded that Senator Merkley—one of the bill’s primary 
Senate sponsors—“certainly did not seem to contemplate self-verification 
as an option.”177  These individuals might expect courts to reject the SEC’s 
proposed regulations as either exceeding the scope of the agency’s 
discretion or “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.”178 
 
B.  The SEC Should be More Proactive Regarding Information 
Security 
 
[65] Data security implications are receiving greater scrutiny. On 
December 19, 2013, Target announced that “[a]pproximately 40 million 
credit and debit card accounts may have been impacted [in a data breach] 
between Nov. 27 and Dec. 15, 2013.”179  The breach held the public’s 
attention for months as the details got progressively worse.  On December 
27, 2014, Target “sa[id] . . . ongoing forensics investigation into the data 
breach revealed that encrypted debit card PIN information was accessed . . 
                                                                                                                         
175
 See Seidt, supra note 99, at 1–3 (“[W]e are confused by the Commission’s attempt to 
exercise discretion that it does not have to the detriment of investors in . . . critical areas . 
. . .  It is doubtful that the Commission’s investor self-certification approach will be 
sufficient to meet the standard set forth in the statute.”). 
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. .”180  By January 2014, the company estimated that “70 million to 110 
million people” had personal information stolen.181  Within a week of the 
breach, the market for stolen credit cards spiked dramatically.182  This, and 
other breaches at large corporations, “have sparked concern from U.S. 
lawmakers and consumers over who should bear the cost of consumer 
losses and how to improve cybersecurity.”183  Intuitively, this becomes 
more concerning as the information exposed becomes more personal.  
 
[66] Even though it requires relatively little information from investors 
to enforce the JOBS Act’s investment caps, the SEC could still protect 
their privacy concerns more effectively.  Seizing on the growing visibility 
of data breaches, securities regulators seem to have started paying 
attention to the issue.  In its comments on the SEC’s proposed regulations, 
NASAA “urge[d]” the SEC to consider the following: 
 
New Section 4A(a)(9) of the Securities Act of 1933 
requires intermediaries to take such steps to protect investor 
privacy as the Commission deems appropriate, and the 
proposed rule would require funding portals to comply with 
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the same privacy rules that are applicable to brokers.  Given 
the recent breaches in consumer financial data, the 
proliferation of identity theft, and the possibility that the 
lack of data security may lead to losses far greater than the 
amount invested, the proposed privacy requirement is a 
critical safeguard for investor data.  It will also enhance 
the overall integrity of intermediary platforms for the 
benefit of issuers.184 
 
As noted above, the SEC proposed essentially extending the privacy 
regulations currently applicable to established securities brokers.185  Also 
noted above, however, is the fact that crowdfunding intermediaries are not 
necessarily comparable to established securities brokers.186  Describing its 
proposed recordkeeping requirements on funding portals, the SEC bluntly 
stated, “[b]ecause funding portals would be engaged in a more limited 
range of activities than brokers and a relatively high proportion of funding 
portals would be new market entrants that may not have formal 
recordkeeping practices in place, the proposed requirements are relatively 
streamlined, compared to those for brokers.”187  This acknowledgement 
brings into question the wisdom of applying the Privacy Rules applicable 
to brokers to all intermediaries (i.e., including funding portals).  
1.  Protection of Personal Information Collected 
[67] The SEC currently allows brokers to craft their own policies 
governing how they use and protect their customers’ personal information 
within some broad parameters.188  This approach is designed to provide a 
                                                 
184
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great deal of flexibility to determine the appropriate policies in light of the 
unique considerations of individual brokers.189  It also reduces the 
regulatory burden by allowing brokers to bypass more specific regulations 
that may not be appropriate for each entity.190  The SEC’s proposed 
crowdfunding regulations would generally pass these benefits on to the 
emerging funding portals.191  In theory, that would also promote the 
growth of the crowdfunding industry as a whole by making it easier for a 
great many intermediaries (i.e., “funding portals”) to operate by reducing 
the number of absolute requirements with which they have to comply. 
 
[68] The SEC should apply more specific, and perhaps more exacting, 
standards to these “new market entrants” lacking “formal recordkeeping 
practices in place . . . .”192  At the very least, the SEC should specify 
baseline elements that each privacy and data protection program should 
include.  As the Commission has suggested—if not said explicitly—many 
of the crowdfunding intermediaries are young entities with little 
experience collecting, holding and protecting consumer information.193  
The proposed rules, however, treat those entities like banks and brokerage 
firms even though they may not have the experience and expertise of 
banks and brokerage firms.194 
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[69] Opponents to greater regulation could make several reasonable 
arguments.  First, risks to consumer information are inherent in today’s 
Internet-centric world.  Sony suffered at least seven data breaches on 
multiple websites in April and May 2011 alone.195  More recently, in 2013, 
Adobe suffered a data breach that “impacted at least 38 million users . . . 
.”196  If companies like Adobe and Sony are susceptible, maybe we should 
not hamstring crowdfunding’s potential with burdensome protective 
measures.  But the fact that wealthy, established, sophisticated companies 
like Adobe and Sony are vulnerable is all the more reason to require 
baseline protective measures by many young, inexperienced companies 
that might not have the knowledge or incentives to implement them on 
their own initiative.  
 
[70] On a related note, some might argue that people give personal—
including financial—information to web-based businesses every single 
day.  Why should crowdfunding platforms be subject to unique, additional 
requirements?  It is equally reasonable, however, to ask whether those 
other businesses should be subject to more specific requirements to 
safeguard the personal information they collect from customers.  But more 
specific to the point, as a new and already incredibly diverse industry, 
crowdfunding platforms and investors would benefit from some standard 
regulation.  Intermediaries would receive some sort of baseline guidance 
concerning the privacy protections they should implement.  Investors 
would receive the assurance of some fundamental protection, and the fact 
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that they are not entering some sort of deregulated investment wasteland. 
In fact, skeptics of equity crowdfunding have frequently described it as 
“the Wild West of fundraising.”197  In reality, if this new avenue is going 
to succeed in creating capital opportunities as its advocates hope, investors 
must feel that risks of fraud and privacy breaches are small.198  Some 
proactive regulation could promote that interest in crowdfunding’s early 
stages. 
 
[71] In some areas of its proposed rules, the SEC seems content to rely 
on intermediaries’ interest in “the reputational integrity of its platform and 
crowdfunding . . . in general . . .” to essentially self-regulate.199  This alone 
probably will not provide effective assurance across the entire 
crowdfunding spectrum. Many of the crowdfunding platforms emerging 
probably have interests competing with their incentives to provide diligent 
privacy protections.  Specifically, many would probably rather spend 
resources establishing the business than invest in preventing seemingly 
speculative security risks.  Others might simply underestimate those risks 
and decide that they do not merit the expenditure of significant resources.  
At the very least, the behavioral impact of these reputational interests are 
speculative and should not be relied upon at this early stage of the 
crowdfunding industry as an effective replacement for real governmental 
oversight. 
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[72] The size of an entity matters when it comes to protecting the 
personal information it collects. Smaller entities are frequently more 
vulnerable than their larger counterparts. “With limited budgets and few or 
no technical experts on staff, small businesses generally have weak 
security.”200  Many smaller operations also seem to believe that their lack 
of visibility provides protection from security threats.  For example, in 
2011, the Wall Street Journal interviewed the owner of two magazine 
shops in the Chicago area.  Hackers “planted a software program on the 
cash registers at his . . . shops that sent customer credit-card numbers to 
Russia.”201  After the attack, the owner explained, “[w]ho would want to 
break into us? . . . [w]e’re not running a bank.”202 
 
[73] Minimal resources combined with naiveté creates a playground for 
computer criminals and a major problem concerning the protection of 
personal information.  Hackers apparently recognize the opportunity, and 
“are expanding their sights beyond multinationals to include any business 
that stores data in electronic form.”203  Sixty-three percent of the 761 data 
breaches the U.S. Secret Service and Verizon forensic analysis unit 
responded to in 2010 occurred “at companies with 100 employees or 
fewer.”204  According to Visa, “about 95% of the credit-card data breaches 
it discovers are on its smallest business customers.”205   
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[74] Tech startups are no exception to this problem.  Like companies in 
other industries, young Internet-based companies have to survive before 
they grow, which shapes their priorities.206  With limited resources and 
other priorities, data security does not receive the attention that the 
companies and their customers would probably prefer.207  This tendency 
makes perfect sense.  As the owner of a startup, why would you invest in 
data security to protect your reputation and customers if the required 
investment takes a large chunk out of your profits?  “[A]ll too often, 
security researchers and analysts say founders’ approach to security is still 
simply to pray . . . their company is not hacked, and to ask for forgiveness 
if it is.”208 
 
[75] Moreover, like young companies elsewhere, tech startups are 
frequently unaware of the threats they face.  “Often start-ups can be in 
over their heads before they know it.”209  These companies frequently 
remain in the dark, even as they collect more personal information, 
“rival[ing] what the government itself can collect.”210  Unfortunately, those 
“government agencies have no jurisdiction to protect it, or even the ability 
to share classified threat information with the companies, leaving the onus 
to protect personal data from cybercriminals and nation-states upon the 
                                                 
206
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companies themselves.”211  That assignment of responsibility leaves 
consumers at risk if the companies’ focus lies elsewhere. 
 
[76] Wortham and Perlroth also provide a number of examples that 
highlight tech startups’ vulnerability.  “Snapchat . . . repeatedly ignored 
warnings about a data breach that exposed millions of user names and 
phone numbers . . . .”212  Tinder—a dating application that uses a phone’s 
location to identify nearby singles—“acknowledged flaws in its software 
that would let hackers pinpoint the exact locations of people using the 
service.”213  And Kickstarter, one of the most recognized crowdfunding 
platforms, “said . . . that hackers had gained access to customer data, 
including passwords and phone numbers.”214 
 
[77] We have seen this effect in other areas as well.  The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 required the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) to perform periodic audits to 
ensure covered entities and businesses are complying with the [Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act] Privacy and Security Rules 
and Breach Notification Standards.215  The DHHS Office of Civil Rights 
released the results of its initial audit in March 2012.  The initial audit 
results “confirmed” that security violations were the most common, and 
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“[s]mall covered entities had a lot more issues than large ones.”216  
According to QI Partners, a healthcare information consulting firm, “small 
organizations are often the easiest target and source of data.”217  These 
entities “often lack the resources to know what tools to put in place to 
avoid cyber attacks and data breaches.”218 
 
[78] Small businesses are not only more vulnerable to data breaches, 
but also suffer disproportionately when they occur.  The average cost of a 
data breach in the United States is $188 per record.219  This cost can add up 
quickly for a small business even with relatively few records in its 
possession.220  These businesses also might not “have the financial cushion 
to deal with the costs of a breach.”221  A breach can also harm a business’ 
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reputation and cause a loss of customers that small and developing 
businesses need to avoid.222  At least some startups recognize “the gravity 
of security missteps.”223  “Everyone would acknowledge that one misstep 
and you’re toast . . . .”224  Congress and President Obama hoped that equity 
crowdfunding could become an engine of capital formation for small 
businesses and startups.  This will never happen if the companies 
facilitating transactions are overly exposed to financially devastating cyber 
threats, and investors cannot trust those companies with their personal 
information. 
 
2.  The SEC Should Restrict How Crowdfunding 
Platforms May Use Personal Information 
 
[79] The SEC’s proposed rules would allow intermediaries collecting 
personal information from investors to become huge players in the 
exploding market for personal information.  That market “comprises a 
menagerie of advertisers, marketers, ad networks, data brokers, website 
publishers, social networks, and online tracking and targeting companies, 
for all of which the main currency—what they buy, sell, and trade—is 
personal data.”225  “Virtually every piece of personal information that 
[individuals] provide online (and much that you provide offline) will end 
up being bought and sold, segmented, packaged, analyzed, repackaged, 
and sold again.”226  The questions then become whether this phenomenon 
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is dangerous or beneficial, and whether crowdfunding intermediaries 
should participate? 
 
a.  Dangers & Benefits of the Consumer Data 
Industry 
 
[80] Consumer advocates are concerned that companies can buy and 
sell personal information for inappropriate purposes.  For example, 
“[p]eople are using data broker information to make important decisions 
about the real you based on the virtual you, decisions like your credit 
score, your insurance rates, and even whether you get a job.”227  “[T]his 
data is frequently inaccurate,” so people could be unfairly penalized based 
on false assumptions.228 
 
[81] Adding new data brokers also compounds existing information 
security problems by putting even more personal information at risk.  Take 
Acxiom for example.  Acxiom is a data broker with a “database 
contain[ing] information about 500 million active consumers worldwide, 
with about 1,500 data points per person.”229  While it controls this huge 
catalogue of information, “cybersecurity experts who examined Acxiom’s 
Web site for The [New York] Times found basic security lapses on an 
online form for consumers seeking access to their own profiles.”230  
Allowing vulnerable companies to buy and sell additional information 
puts that additional information at risk.  Information inherently becomes 
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less secure each time it is shared or exchanged because it provides at least 
one more point of potential access. 
 
[82] There are potential benefits of this industry.  Companies use large 
amounts of personal data to “improve the relevance of ads people see on 
[sites like] Facebook and the efficacy of marketing campaigns.”231  
Proponents argue that consumers “ultimately” benefit because “[t]hey get 
to see better, more relevant ads from brands and businesses they care 
about and that they have a prior relationship with.”232  Companies are also 
willing to pay more for targeted ads based on consumers’ personal 
information, which allows sites like Dictionary.com and Facebook to 
avoid charging users for access.233  
 
[83] However, consumers are ultimately still paying a price when 
companies trade off of their personal information.  Many consumers 
probably do not view targeted advertisements as some great privilege.  To 
those consumers, the ads are still simply invitations to spend their hard-
earned money for the benefit of the advertiser.  Moreover, consumers pay 
for sites like Facebook and Dictionary.com with at least some autonomy, 
as users do not receive any explicit choice between control over their 
personal information and access.234 
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b.  Should Crowdfunding Intermediaries 
Participate as Brokers of Personal Information? 
 
[84] The SEC should seize this opportunity to provide crowdfunding 
investors greater control over the personal information they disclose to 
crowdfunding intermediaries. “[C]onsumers are often unaware of the 
existence of data brokers as well as the purposes for which they collect 
and use consumers data.”235  In December 2012, “[t]he Federal Trade 
Commission issued orders requiring nine data brokerage companies to 
provide the agency with information about how they collect and use data 
about consumers.”236  The FTC intended to take the information provided 
by the companies “to prepare a study and to make recommendations on 
whether, and how, the data broker industry could improve its privacy 
practices.”237  So, most do not realize this is happening, they do not expect 
it to happen and regulators do not fully understand the potential risks.238  
Meanwhile, the general public is “accepting more privacy intrusions each 
day, sometimes because we don’t realize what we’re giving out, other 
times because we don’t feel we have a choice, [and] other times because 
the harm of this isolated transaction seems so remote.”239 
 
[85] The White House has echoed many of the FTC’s observations of 
the growing data brokerage industry.  These entities gather and analyze a 
growing amount of personal information about American consumers 
without any “direct relationship with the consumers whose information 
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they collect.”240  There are also reasons to doubt that this information is 
always used in desirable ways.241  “Consumers deserve more transparency 
about how their data is shared beyond the entities with which they do 
business directly . . . .”242  With this landscape in mind, the SEC should 
consider precluding intermediaries from selling, sharing, or otherwise 
disclosing investors’ personal information beyond what is absolutely 
necessary to facilitate crowdfunding investment.  Doing so would limit 
disclosures from one significant pool of information, and comport with the 
privacy expectations most investors probably have when they interact with 
crowdfunding intermediaries.  It would also promote the FTC’s goal of 
making the data brokerage industry more transparent by giving 
crowdfunding investors a concrete understanding of how their information 
will, and will not, be shared.  Lastly, from a broader perspective, this is an 
opportunity to start moving back toward personal control over personal 
information, rather than accepting a lack of any control whatsoever as the 
norm. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
[86] Congress passed, and the President signed, the JOBS Act to 
facilitate capital formation for emerging businesses that lacked access to 
the capital they needed.  In doing so, they also called on the SEC to strike 
a tricky balancing act between that goal of capital formation and investors’ 
privacy interests.  The SEC’s proposed rules seem to reflect that 
fundamental objective by imposing a relatively light regulatory burden on 
crowdfunding participants and thereby making their participation easier.  
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[87] That approach favors individual privacy interests because investors 
may participate by making minimal personal disclosures that do not even 
have to be true.  At the same time, the proposed rules may compromise 
security interests by not requiring any concrete actions by the 
intermediaries who collect personal information.  The SEC should go 
further than rely upon the unproven judgment of hundreds of emerging 
businesses with little track record of handling that information.  Instead, 
specifying—and requiring—some basic threshold collection, handling, 
and protective measures is appropriate, particularly at this stage of 
crowdfunding’s development.  
 
[88] At this point, equity crowdfunding is a great unknown.  Proponents 
characterize it as a great, untapped resource of financing that can drive a 
wave of small businesses and startups and the job opportunities that go 
along with them.  Skeptics, on the other hand, portray it as a wild west of 
investment where cunning schemesters will dupe, defraud, and abuse 
unwitting rube investors.  For the optimistic outlook to become a reality, 
equity crowdfunding must be credible and reliable.  While widespread 
fraud would certainly undermine that credibility, data security is another 
potential pitfall.  Potential investors simply will not participate if the 
information they provide is not (or not perceived to be) secure.  
Meanwhile, data breaches seem to be growing in number and visibility, 
and tech startups—which include all of the hundreds of crowdfunding 
platforms—are frequently ill equipped to face the threat.  Accordingly, the 
SEC should be proactive and require any equity crowdfunding portal to 
take certain baseline measures to protect investors’ information.  In the 
end, the success of this new means of capital formation could depend on 
it.   
